



Per 2 M.D. TAYLOR
x Sec 6 Cuba
x As 7 Taylor
x Pers 2 B.S.
MC NAMARA

A SOLDIER & THE WHITE HOUSE

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE



PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISER
TAYLOR



Pack snifter or old-fashioned glass with crushed ice. Add jigger of Old Fitz and twist of lemon peel. Relax and enjoy!

Nothing cooler than a *Fitz' Mist* ...

Nothing easier to make...

Nothing more memorable than
the flavor and bouquet of the one and only

OLD FITZGERALD

Kentucky's one and only Premium* Bourbon exclusively Bottled-in-Bond

*At its price or higher

STITZEL-WELLER DISTILLERY, ESTABLISHED LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 1847 • 100 PROOF



Vol. LXXVIII No. 4

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

July 28, 1961

THE NATION

THE COLD WAR

Chief of Staff

(See Cover)

Military measures have no merit in themselves. They are only tools of a broader strategy in a cold or hot war.

These are the words of the paratroop general who led "The Battered Bastards of Bastogne," of the military diplomat who commanded U.S. troops in Berlin (1949) and Korea (1953), of the scholarly Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1945), of the restless, rebellious Army Chief of Staff under Dwight Eisenhower. They are the words of General Maxwell Davenport Taylor, U.S.A. (ret.), soldier and statesman who, by a remarkable turn in the wheel of fortune and the special needs of John F. Kennedy, last week had the biggest, toughest job of his career: military and intelligence adviser to the President of the United States.

Since he began his job last month, Maxwell Taylor has been at the President's side during every major discussion of the gathering crises facing the nation: Southeast Asia, the looming difficulty of Red China and the U.N., and especially Berlin, where grateful citizens have named a street *Taylorstrasse* to honor his service there. As the new man on the White House staff, Taylor has been scrupulously careful not to give advice until asked—but he was being asked more and more, as he won Kennedy's confidence, with a manner both incisive and decisive. Says Kennedy: "A definitive, tough mind." Fast emerging as the strong man of the White House staff, Taylor is in fact President Kennedy's chief of staff in the basic task of plotting U.S. cold war strategy.

All of a sudden, he seems to be everywhere in official Washington—an aloof, handsome man with cool china blue eyes, a knack for sketching a problem in broad perspective, and a talent for hammering out explicit courses of action. Last week he attended the meeting of the National Security Council, took part in the intensive, two-hour session with Kennedy in the

White House where plans for Berlin began to harden. From time to time, he sat in on the President's talks with official visitors. He made himself available to the White House team on problems far removed from the military. Over and over again, Kennedy staffers were heard to say: "Let's go ask Taylor about this."

Flexible or Inflexible? Maxwell Taylor's presence in the White House is symbolic of an evolving change in the U.S. military posture, a change that is reflected in the planning for Berlin and Southeast Asia, and in the defense budget now before Congress. For Taylor is the leading advocate of the philosophy of "flexible response" to Soviet aggression—a varied U.S. capability for action that might range all the way from rifle fire to a hail of nuclear missiles on Moscow. Taylor argues that the nuclear standoff between Russia and the U.S. makes a "general war" less likely than a "limited war,"

which would be fought by conventional armies backed up, if need be, by tactical atomic weapons. Many U.S. military men claim that the U.S. is now prepared for limited warfare, but Taylor has argued time and again that the U.S. is ill-equipped to counter aggression with any means but the "inflexible response" of nuclear retaliation.

Faced with a conventional attack, says Taylor, the U.S. now has no alternative but to risk national suicide by starting an all-out war "or retreat in the face of the superiority of Soviet conventional forces. We have accepted as a deliberate decision continued inferiority on the ground in those areas where we may be challenged on the Communist periphery."

"Sense of Urgency." As Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959, Taylor fought unsuccessfully for a bigger and better-equipped Army, finally quit in frustration, and poured his theories into an outspoken

book he called *The Uncertain Trumpet*. As a sort of casual afterthought, Taylor admitted in his book that his program would call for a budget of from \$50 billion to \$55 billion a year, a sum that invoked scoffing laughter in Congress. But the book caught the eye of Senator Kennedy, who contributed a blurb for the publisher: "This volume is characterized by an unmistakable honesty, clarity of judgment, and a genuine sense of urgency."

Since then, President Kennedy seems to have bought Taylor's views on limited war. The Administration's \$47.7 billion defense budget now before the Senate contains over \$1 billion more than last year's to buy equipment for fighting a limited war. The nation's limited war forces will get another big boost this week when Kennedy announces that he will ask Congress for over \$3 billion more for defense (see Foreign Relations).

The planning for Berlin, endorsed by both Taylor and Adviser Dean Acheson, calls for the U.S. to be prepared to fight a limited war, instead of devastating Russia with H-bombs as soon as a Soviet soldier fires the first rifle shot. The Administration's reasoning: a limited



U.S. TANKS ON BERLIN'S TAYLORSTRASSE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The goal: more than one response to aggression

war against Russia would leave the situation flexible enough so that general war might be averted. Many U.S. officials argue that, by definition, it would be impossible for two great powers such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to fight a limited war. But Taylor has long claimed that a limited war in Europe was indeed possible. To take the other view, Taylor says in *The Uncertain Trumpet*, "means that any collision of patrols would automatically result in general atomic war."

Steely Glint. In his new job General Taylor wears sober civilian suits, but they do nothing to cloak the commanding air of a professional soldier. Though he is doing his best to fit in with the free-wheeling White House staffers—as non-military a group as any college faculty—the first time one of the resident eggheads greeted Taylor with an airy "Good morning, Max," the glint of steel flashed in

German, Spanish and French. "Taylor is an intellectual," says one White House staffer. "You give him a problem in the Middle East, and he wants to know how Xerxes handled it."

April Fiasco. Although he had never met Taylor, President Kennedy was so impressed by *The Uncertain Trumpet* and the man's general reputation that he began looking for a job for him right after taking office. In all, Taylor was suggested for at least eight jobs on the New Frontier. Kennedy even considered him for Secretary of Defense but reluctantly decided against the idea because he did not want a military man in the job.

Then, in April, John Kennedy made the great blunder of his Administration: he sent the ill-prepared, anti-Castro rebels into the Bay of Pigs. What was more, Kennedy made the military mistake of withholding air support from the rebels.

made for Taylor. Every foreign crisis facing the U.S.—from West Berlin to South Viet Nam—has its military implications. But the White House staffers, in whom the President has confidence, have no military experience, and Kennedy had lost faith in the military advice that he was getting from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Says one ranking Pentagon official of Army General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "The President just doesn't find Lemnitzer responsive to his needs. He's just not the forceful, dynamic, persuasive person that this situation requires."

Taylor was exactly the man the President wanted to have around. Agreed Lobby Kennedy, the Administration's recruiting officer: "We need a man like Taylor to give things a cold and fishy eye." The problem was to put Taylor in a position to do just that. For a while, Kennedy toyed with the idea of replacing Lemnitzer with Taylor but gave it up because of the predictable explosion that the move would have touched off in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. Finally, Kennedy created a special job for Taylor: Military Representative of the President.

Pentagon Battle. At the President's discretion Taylor is available to give top-level, searching criticism on plans submitted by either the civilians in the White House or the military men in the Pentagon. So far, Bundy, Rostow & Co. have worked well with Taylor because they admire his brains and background. But the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are bracing for a fight: they see Taylor's appointment as a direct challenge to their authority.

Taylor left himself few allies in the Pentagon when he shed his uniform and storied back into civilian life in 1959. The Air Force is still enraged at his criticism of massive retaliation, call his book "The Unclean Trumpet." Senior Pentagon officers as a whole were shocked by his scheme to scrap the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of a single Defense Chief of Staff. And most of the Army generals who supported Taylor's doctrine of flexible response have long since been transferred to other posts.

Says one former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Taylor was consistent, I'll say that for him. He never stepped pressing the case for limited war, and he never demonstrated much understanding of the other side of the picture. Well, he was wrong all the way, and he was consistent in that, too."

Hill Barrage. Military Analyst S.L.A. ("Slam") Marshall of the *Detroit News*, a retired brigadier general and one of the nation's leading military historians (*The River and the Gauntlet*), has serious reservations about the man he followed through Normandy, Holland, Belgium and Korea. "I think I know Max Taylor as well as any man in America. He was an extraordinary battle commander—the most tightly self-disciplined officer I ever knew. But Taylor is the wrong man for this job. Taylor is not a conciliator. He's actively interested in the exercise of power."



DEFENSE SECRETARY McNAMARA & GENERAL LEMNITZER
Accommodation found; confidence lost.

the general's eye. But Taylor managed to restrain his celebrated talent for chewing out an offender and smiled a casual hello.

For all his bone-hard military manner, Taylor has shown the Kennedys that he can handle himself agilely in any social situation—from humorously barbed, dinner-party small talk to the more energetic competition of the tennis court. Taylor frequently takes on Bobby Kennedy, has confided to a friend: "We're pretty even. But when they give me a good doubles partner, I usually win."

Occasionally cupping a hand to an ear—he was deafened slightly by a demolition charge in the '30s—Taylor has also demonstrated that he can hold his own in high-powered debate with such White House word men as McGeorge Bundy, the former faculty dean of Harvard University, M.I.T.'s Walt Rostow, or Arthur Schlesinger, Harvard's Pulitzer prize-winning historian. A linguist of intimidating intensity, Taylor is fluent in Japanese,

Publicly, Kennedy shouldered the responsibility for the Cuban fiasco, but in private he blamed the advice he got from the Central Intelligence Agency and the military guidance he received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mad and upset, Kennedy looked about for a man to find out what went wrong. A quick phone call, and Maxwell Taylor took the job.

For nearly two months, Taylor and Bobby Kennedy holed up in an office in the Pentagon and worked over CIA data with the help of CIA Chief Allen Dulles and Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke. Last month, with the concurrence of his colleagues, Taylor made his main report orally to John Kennedy. Said he: the CIA should have no operational role in future major actions similar to the Cuban venture but should be allowed to continue small-scale, covert activities.

Bigger Problem. But Jack Kennedy was already beginning to realize that a far bigger problem remained at the heart of his Administration—a problem larger

On Capitol Hill, a regiment of Republicans, supported by some dissident Democrats, is already sighting and ready to open fire on Taylor at his first mistake. In part, the opposition to the general stems from his past attacks on General Dwight Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs, but a surprising amount of it is smoldering resentment of Taylor's reserved manner—as if any degree of introspection were a dangerous symptom indeed. "He was always a loner," says one Congressman. "He'd never mix with the fellows when we went on trips, drink a beer or join in chitchat. He'd go over in a corner of the plane and read a book." Says one Hill leader: "I see nothing but trouble ahead."

By the Book. With storm signals like these slapping vigorously in dangerous winds, Kennedy and Taylor are picking their course with caution. Said Kennedy to an associate: "This appointment doesn't inject Taylor between me and the Pentagon until I assign him to a specific problem." Taylor, for his part, has assured the Joint Chiefs that he will help them get the President's ear, has promised to inform them about anything of substance he tells Kennedy.

The man most endangered by Taylor's appointment is Defense Secretary McNamara, the former Ford president who is working 72 hours a week to tighten civilian control over the Pentagon. McNamara has already alienated the Joint Chiefs by slashing across service boundaries and flouting traditions. If Taylor, in his turn, should cut him off from the President, McNamara would be floating in limbo. But since Taylor's appointment, three key policy papers requested by Kennedy have gone to the White House from the Pentagon. Kennedy had Taylor screen only one, and then instructed him to keep McNamara fully informed. "After that," said one White House staffer, "McNamara noticeably relaxed." Says one Pentagon official: "McNamara and Taylor are finding their minds work in much the same way. There's a good personal accommodation there."

In everything he did last week, Max-

well Taylor was following the military textbook rule of working through channels. Few soldiers have ever learned that book as well as Taylor, a man who leads not because he has the personal magnetism of a Patton or a Chennault, but because he earns the respect of his men by simple professional skill and dogged devotion to duty. "You just can't get close to him," says one man who has admired him for years. "Apparently he doesn't need that." Says another admirer: "He's strictly a West Point officer. He even kept his bearing one time when he got sick on some Atabrine pills. With his head in a pot, Maxwell Taylor still looked like a general."

Army v. Navy. An only child, Taylor was born to a struggling lawyer in Keytesville, Mo., and raised in Kansas City. As a toddler, he used to be enthralled by his one-armed grandfather's



TAYLOR & KENNEDY
Always there.



TAYLOR AS PARATROOPER (1944)
Every risk.

tales of riding with the Confederate cavalry of General Jo Shelby. Young Max was a solemn five when he announced to his mother: "When I'm big, I'm going to West Point—that's where the big boys go to be officers in the Army."

But when Taylor graduated from high school in 1917 with straight E's (for Excellent) in Latin, Greek and Spanish, he hedged his bet on West Point by also taking exams for Annapolis. He passed the Army's test but flunked the Navy's because of a vagueness about geography. Says Taylor: "If the Strait of Malacca had been in Europe, I might have been an admiral instead of a general."

Brilliant Beginning. At West Point, Taylor played varsity tennis, met a girl named Lydia Happer, whom he married in 1925, and graduated fourth in the class of 1922. Like many top-ranking graduates, Taylor chose the engineers—and began his brilliant career. For most

Army officers, the '20s and '30s were drab years of no activity and few promotions. Taylor was a lieutenant for 13 years, but he led the lively life reserved for the outstanding young officer—language study in both France and Japan, a tour as an instructor at West Point, then assignment to the Command and Staff School and the Army War College.

In 1942 Brigadier General Taylor became artillery commander of the Army's first airborne division, the 82nd, commanded by General Matt Ridgway. He soon found that it was his kind of outfit. "I don't like to jump," Taylor once confessed frankly, "but I like to be with people who like to jump." Taylor went into action with the 82nd in Africa and Sicily, soon earned a reputation as a tough, resourceful officer and was singled out for one of the most dramatic cloak-and-dagger missions of the war.

Mission to Rome. In September 1943, with invasion imminent, Italy wanted desperately to surrender to the Allies. The Italians under Marshal Badoglio maintained that the 82nd could capture Rome by making a surprise landing. General Dwight Eisenhower assigned Taylor and Air Corps Colonel William T. Gardiner to check out the scheme by going to Rome.

Aware that they stood a good chance of being captured, Taylor and Gardiner wore their uniforms lest they be shot as spies. The two men transferred from a British PT boat to an Italian corvette and were put ashore in the port of Gaeta. They made the 75-mile trip to Rome in an Italian truck, stayed back of the enemy lines for two days, discovered that Badoglio could not give the necessary support to a landing, called off the attack by radio and were flown out to Tunis in an Italian plane. Eisenhower later wrote of Taylor: "The risks he ran were greater than I asked any other agent or emissary to undertake during the war."

Click-Click. On the night of June 6, 1944, Major General Taylor became general to invade Europe when he led his 101st Airborne



TAYLOR & KENNEDY
Ever partisan.

Division on the jump. Taylor struggled out of his chute harness and found himself surrounded by mildly curious cows. For 20 minutes, Taylor hunted frantically for his division. Finally he heard the click-click of the toy cricket that his paratroopers used to signal in the darkness. Taylor click-clicked back, jumped over a hedge and hugged a 101st G.I.—“the finest, most beautiful American soldier I’ve ever seen. A fine private with his bayonet fixed.”

Taylor then collected Brigadier General Tony McAuliffe, a flock of colonels and staff officers, a correspondent from Reuters and a few score soldiers and led the attack that opened up a causeway from Utah Beach for the 4th Division. Says Taylor: “Never were so few led by so many.” To his stunned surprise, Taylor got the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action after a staff officer sneaked his name onto the citation list. The embarrassed Taylor gave the officer a memorable chewing out.

Rump Session. In Normandy, and later in Holland, Taylor proved himself to be a master tactician, maneuvered his division with consistent versatility to keep open roads and harass the enemy. He insisted on peak performance from his staff, unceremoniously sacked one senior colonel for failing to act boldly. A stickler for discipline, Taylor once gave a lieutenant a medal for a dangerous patrol and simultaneously fined him \$50 for not being clean-shaven. Taylor was harder on himself than anyone, making personal reconnaissances by Jeep, risking injury unnecessarily by sitting stubbornly at a staff table while shells fell in the courtyard outside.

Taylor eventually was wounded in the rump by a mortar fragment while making a tour of a forward area against the angry advice of a sergeant, who warned of the alert enemy. When Taylor was hit, the sergeant stormed up to his rescue with an attitude that was anything but solicitous: “Goddammit, General, now do you believe me?” Taylor spent ten days in the hospital, but made his staff keep his name off the wounded list for fear he would lose his command.

Who’s Worried? Ironically, Taylor was back in the U.S. for consultation when his 101st faced its darkest moments of the war. Attacking in the last-ditch Battle of the Bulge, the Germans surrounded the division at Bastogne. When a delegation arrived to negotiate for the surrender of the 101st, Tony McAuliffe, the acting commander, became one of the most famous soldiers of World War II by firing back a one-word answer: “Nuts.”

Meanwhile, Taylor was frantically trying to get a plane ride back to Europe. “I’ve got 10,000 sons,” he kept telling his wife, “and they’re my responsibility.” On Christmas Eve, 1944, Taylor gave his two boys, Tom and Jack, their presents, and finally was able to hop a cargo flight across the Atlantic. Just three days later, Taylor jeoped into Bastogne with the first elements of the 4th Armored Division. Taylor found McAuliffe coolly get-

ting ready for dinner. “No damned reason to be worried about us,” said McAuliffe. “We’re ready to attack.”

Battle Fatigue. After the war, Maxwell Taylor got the coveted assignment of Superintendent of West Point,* promptly expanded the liberal arts courses and set the cadets to studying the dissenting opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes and the poems of T. S. Eliot. Taylor posted a sign in the West Point locker room reading, “No pot belly will ever lead the corps of cadets,” and became renowned as a give-no-quarter handball player.

In 1949, Taylor moved on to command U.S. forces in West Berlin. Speaking German well—he installed an instructor at his luncheon table—Taylor impressed



LYDIA & MAXWELL TAYLOR
“I’ve got 10,000 sons.”

West Berliners with his skill as an emissary and his tough treatment of Communist capers. When Communist students in East Berlin made plans to stage a provocative march on the western half of the city, Taylor cooled them off in advance by holding elaborate riot-control drills. Taylor won over the students by offering them books and tickets to shows in West Berlin. After a brief tour in the Pentagon, Taylor went to Korea in 1953 as the commander of the Eighth Army in the waning months of the war, started his own effective program of rebuilding hospitals and schools, and helped train the Korean Army. At one ceremony activating new Korean divisions, Taylor astonished Syngman Rhee by giving a rousing speech in Korean.

Then General Matt Ridgway was forced into retirement as Chief of Staff after

* At 44, Taylor was the second youngest man to be superintendent. The youngest: Douglas MacArthur, who was superintendent at 39. Lee, Taylor’s hero, got the job at 45.

campaigning too loudly for a larger Army. In June 1955, Maxwell Taylor was picked by President Eisenhower, his old friend and admirer, to be the Army Chief, and he began to fight the only losing battle of his career. “I think Napoleon himself could have been Chief of Staff in that period and looked like a bum,” says one able Army colonel. Taylor quickly found himself bracketed between Army Secretary Wübrer Brucker, who undercut him constantly, and squabbling factions of officers, who campaigned publicly for their specialties, whether long-range missiles or one-man helicopters.

But Taylor soon found that his main opponent was Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the confidant of President Eisenhower. Radford was one of the prime exponents of the theory of massive nuclear retaliation, which had been originated by State Secretary John Foster Dulles. In *The Uncertain Trumpet*, Taylor calls Radford “an able and ruthless partisan,” for the way he imposed the policy upon the Joint Chiefs.

Taylor got nowhere in his behind-the-scenes battle for a bigger Army and managed in the process to lose the friendship of Dwight Eisenhower. When he finally retired in 1959, Taylor said wryly: “For four years I have struggled to modernize the Army, and my success was limited. So I decided I would do one thing for the country and withdraw an obsolescent general from inventory.”

Odds for Peace. Taylor soon proved that he could be at home outside the Army. He worked as chairman of the board of the Mexican Light and Power Co. until the Mexican government nationalized the company in 1960. He was looking around for a job as a college president last winter when he got an offer to head the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts—a cultural oasis rising on Manhattan’s West Side. Working in a totally strange field, Taylor still took firm command. Says Lincoln Center’s Reginald Allen: “There’s no question about it—he’s the most stimulating leader I’ve ever met.” Then in April came the call from President Kennedy and the job in the White House.

Now that Maxwell Taylor is close to the seat of power, many Washington officials are wondering worriedly if he will turn out to have the same relationship with President Kennedy that Admiral Radford had with President Eisenhower. Like Radford, Taylor has the full confidence of his President, and he too has been called an able and ruthless partisan by his critics.

But last week General Taylor was talking about his new job in terms that soared far beyond any interservice squabble in the Pentagon. For the general in the White House is convinced that the U.S. must give “to friend and foe alike a clear expression of our purpose and of our motives. Our military behavior must be visibly consistent with our conduct in the political, economic and intellectual fields. Such are the notes to be sounded by con-

ident leaders who know what they are doing and why. Then we can prepare ourselves calmly to the battle, knowing that if it is properly prepared, the odds are high for peace."

Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000700470017-9

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Speech

The U.S. is ready, willing and able to face up to the danger that threatens at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. But in the mind of John Kennedy, the nation is less prepared for the crises that lurk half-hidden in Africa, South America and Asia. This week John Kennedy would go before Congress and the nation (in a televised speech from the White House) to announce the first stages of the U.S. response to the latest Soviet threats. The emergency measures, while geared to the specific danger of a Berlin conflict, are the start of a long-range, permanent toughening of national muscle for the cold war's far future.

In preparing his speech, the President was still selecting from a range of alternate responses, but the general outlines of his summons to duty were clear. Last week the Selective Service announced a widening of the draft pool from 80,000 to 100,000 men—a preliminary to a larger military step-up. There will be at least three new divisions assigned to the Army, bringing authorized strength up to 870,000 men.* From the Navy's huge moth-ball fleet, landing craft and (possibly) troopships will be activated. The Air Force will gain new troop-carrier wings. The President is unlikely to restore reserve and National Guard units to active duty until and unless he declares a national emergency; but he may ask National Guard commanders to extend the normal period of summer training in order to achieve greater readiness.

New attention will be focused on civil defense. Last week the President turned over to the Pentagon primary responsibility for civil-defense planning. He was also considering a call for a big new program, including more public bomb shelters, food storing and home-shelter education.

Sure that his requests are vital to national security, President Kennedy will at long last ask for the specific sacrifices that he urged the U.S. to make in his Inauguration Speech. The new programs will cost more than \$3 billion. Rather than risk inflation by further deficit spending, the President will ask Congress for a tax hike—and Congress will be hard put to refuse.

* At present the Army has 856,233 men, assigned to 14 divisions (five of them in Europe, three in the Pacific theater), five regiments, 80 air defense battalions, one infantry brigade, one combat command, one armored group. The Navy, with 620,405 men on active duty, has 376 warships, 16 fleet carrier air groups, 31 carrier antisubmarine squadrons, 47 supporting air squadrons. Air Force strength is 819,410 men; the prime weapons are 37 strategic wings (including some 600 B-52s), 19 air defense wings, 32 tactical wings. The Marines have 176,847 men assigned to three divisions (a fourth is being formed), three tactical aircraft wings.

The week's most visible action on Berlin was a blunt and forceful U.S. memorandum, seconded by Britain and France, that answered the June 4 Soviet note demanding a German peace treaty by year's end.

Much thought, second thought, revision* and consultation with allies went into the note. Still, the finished version came as no surprise either to the U.S. public, which has been well-briefed on the dangers of the Berlin crisis, or to the Kremlin, which has been well aware of the day-to-day spine stiffening in Washington. The U.S. note agreed with the Soviet contention that "a peace settlement is long overdue," but wasted no words putting the blame for delay where it properly belonged: on continuing "Soviet efforts to obtain special advantages



HAULDIN—ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
"PERSONALLY, I PREFER TOUCH FOOTBALL."

for itself and the Soviet bloc at the expense of a lasting peace."

Legal Stand. In reviewing the history and language of wartime and postwar agreements for the occupation of Nazi Germany, the U.S. memo made two main points:

¶ The West has a perfect legal right to maintain troops in Berlin, and the Soviet Union cannot abrogate that right by any unilateral action. Such privileges as the West claims in Berlin "derive absolutely from the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, and were not granted by, nor negotiated with, the Soviet Union." Nor can the Soviet Union or its East German allies affect the allied rights of access to Berlin, which are "inherent in the rights of the Western powers to be in Berlin." If those rights of

* In its final form, the memorandum was written by a task force of State Department and White House experts, with finishing touches penned in by the President. State Department officers submitted a first draft that was "awful," according to one of the Administration's many Harvardmen. Said he: "I wouldn't have come up with it in Government 1-A."

with, warned the U.S. note, then the Western Big Three have "the responsibility to make such dispositions with respect to the exercise of their access rights as they deem appropriate."

¶ By setting up a puppet East German government that is "no more than an extension of its own authority," the Soviet Union effectively contradicts the one principle that must underlie any peace treaty: German self-determination. "The United States Government continues to believe that there will be no real solution of the German problem . . . until the German people are reunified on the basis of the universally recognized principle of self-determination." But the Soviet Union, "by denying freedom of choice to 17 million East Germans" has not permitted "freedom or choice to the German people as a whole. It is now proposing to perpetuate that denial by concluding a final settlement with a regime which is not representative of these people." Such a peace treaty, read the U.S. note, "could have no validity in international law, nor could it affect in any way whatever the rights of the Western powers."

No Threat. In its one gesture of conciliation, the U.S. coolly offered to begin negotiations on the future of Germany—if the Soviet Union agrees to the principle of German reunification. Yet even if such negotiations were further delayed, the U.S. continued, the "abnormal" situation of a divided Germany presents no particular threat to peace—unless the Soviet Union decides to "destroy that arrangement in pursuit of its political goals." Summing up, the U.S. memorandum argued that "there is no reason for a crisis over Berlin." If trouble starts through Soviet actions, then "all the world will plainly see that the misuse of such words as 'peace' and 'freedom' cannot conceal a threat to raise tension to the point of danger and suppress the freedom of those who now enjoy it."

Emphatic Observations

Washington reporters last week got some fresh, forthright comment on a perennial problem that faces the U.S.: Red China's insistence that it be admitted to the U.N. After a half-hour visit with President John Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to Nationalist China Everett F. Drumright made some general but emphatic observations.

There is nothing at all inevitable about Red China's admission to the U.N., said Drumright. The Reds' chances in the General Assembly next fall will depend mainly on just how the issue is raised. And on the techniques of U.N. maneuvering, Drumright added, Jack Kennedy is "very well informed." More significantly, while no decision has been made on just what tactic to employ, the President is determined to fight hard. "You may be sure that he will try to come up with a solution that will keep our ally—the government of the Republic of China—in, and the Reds out."

Dead Issue, Dead Letters

During the ill-starred attempt to swap 500 U.S. tractors for 1,214 Cuban prisoners held by Fidel Castro, many a U.S. citizen wondered just how such a deal could possibly benefit the U.S. But last week it seemed that the unsuccessful effort might show a curious profit after all. As a result of fund appeals by the Tractors for Freedom Committee, the Detroit post office was showered with 60,000 pieces of mail. When negotiations bogged down (TIME, June 30), the committee ordered the letters returned. So far, 56,000 that bore return addresses have been sent back unopened, and the committee will never know how much money it actually collected. The remaining letters have been sent to the dead letter office to be opened by postal employees. If the contents contain a clue to the sender, they will be returned. If not, unclaimed funds will go to the U.S. Treasury.

THE ADMINISTRATION Bye Bye Bowles

In the sobering aftermath of the calamitous Cuban invasion, it was no consolation for Jack Kennedy to hear nagging reminders from U.S. liberals that Chester Bowles, his Under Secretary of State, had opposed the plan all along. The very fact that the whole country seemed to have been told about Bowles's stand was especially annoying. The more he thought about it, the more reasons the President found for wanting to shift Bowles far from the Washington scene.

As State's No. 2 man, Bowles was supposed to be goading the department's sluggish bureaucracy into action, leaving Boss Dean Rusk free to follow the global swirl of high policy. But Bowles, used to being top man, never stopped spinning off grand ideas, reshaping the world to his taste. (He kept pushing for his pet Mekong River project in Southeast Asia so hard that even his aides insist he really has only two speeches: the Mekong River speech and the non-Mekong River speech.)

A onetime proponent of the "two-China policy," Bowles complicated the trying problem of Red China's admission to the United Nations by insisting that the Administration embroil itself in full-scale debate on the issue. At Bowles's suggestion, Kennedy made the naive mistake of asking the Russians for a six-month diplomatic moratorium while the new Administration worked out its foreign policy. Bowles earned the enmity of the department's career men by recommending outsiders for important ambassadorships, irked Democratic politicians at the same time by not selecting big party contributors.

Getting the Point. The situation soon became so touchy that Jack Kennedy and his White House aides developed a nervous tic of annoyance whenever they were bothered by Bowles. Finally the President summoned his Under Secretary of State to

a White House lunch. Figuring that the former admiral would quickly get the point, Kennedy gently suggested Bowles might like to become ambassador to Chile.

Bowles really did get the point when friends reminded him of two news stories by the President's good friends Columnist Joe Alsop and the Chattanooga Times's Charlie Bartlett, which detailed Bowles's difficulties. The stories, plus the lunch, could only mean he was being fired. As soon as he got sore, Bowles proved to be no pushover. With familiar Madison Avenue skill, he and his pals leaked a spate of stories on the sinister plot to send him



EDWARD CLARK—LIFE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE BOWLES
The man who came to lunch.

into exile. Their catchy, if misleading pitch: "It will be a curious result if the first head to roll after the Cuban affair is the head of the man who opposed it."

The fuss grew, and reporters jangled telephones in Hyannisport, where the President was seeking weekend relaxation. But Press Secretary Pierre Salinger professed complete ignorance of any attempt to fire Bowles. When he got back to Washington, Kennedy was so irked by the splurge of Bowles-inspired stories that he canceled a White House lunch with Hubert Humphrey, summoned Bowles back to a second meal. This time there were no leaks, but Salinger announced with finality that Bowles was going on an important, 18-day trip to meet with chiefs of U.S. missions in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Obviously, the mounting liberal clamor now made it risky to fire Bowles. "Obviously, he's staying," insisted Salinger.

Rocking the Department. But when Kennedy met the press three days later, it was not at all obvious just how long

Bowles would stay. "Contrary to some reports, I've never asked Mr. Bowles for his resignation, nor has he ever offered it," said the President blandly. "I have always expected that he would be part of this Administration until it concluded its responsibilities." After expressing his "complete confidence" in Bowles, the President then added, equally blandly: "I have put the general principle forward that we are going to attempt to maximize the abilities of everyone working in the Government. If I came to the conclusion that Mr. Bowles could be more effective in another responsible position, I would not hesitate to ask him to take that position, and I am confident Mr. Bowles would not hesitate to take it."

Bowles stayed home most of the rest of the week, ostensibly to prepare for his trip. But he was still sore, and he was still mounting a publicity campaign to keep his job. At week's end it was clear that by turning his survival into a battle that rocked the State Department, Chester Bowles had destroyed his own usefulness at it ensured his eventual removal. And the U.S., which had had a front-page seat at the fight, could only wonder why Jack Kennedy had not chopped Chester Bowles down with one purposeful command, rather than set up an unseemly spectacle as he tried to coax the amiable big-thinker into quitting.

THE CONGRESS School's Out

After House Speaker Sam Rayburn packed the Rules Committee with party liberals last February in order to unlock Administration bills, one of the committeemen counted on most was New York Congressman James J. Delaney. Last week Delaney demonstrated that even packed committees can pack a surprise. When the Rules Committee met to consider a series of aid-to education bills, Delaney joined the conservative bloc, cast the key vote in a narrow 8-7 decision that probably pigeonholed federal aid to schools for the remainder of the season.

Three separate school bills were in the package that came to the Rules Committee from Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell's Labor and Education Committee. One, sponsored by the Kennedy Administration, provided \$2.5 billion for public-school construction and teachers' salaries. The second, added after Roman Catholic protests, authorized \$375 million in private-school construction loans. The third, among other considerations, earmarked \$300 million in loans and grants for college scholarships and buildings.

Triple Taxation. All three bills faced tough sledding if they ever reached the floor of the House. A strong body of conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats opposed any federal aid to schools. Moreover, there was another clique of Southern Democrats who normally vote with the Administration but who also come from staunchly Protestant districts that oppose aid to private